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 A host of bestsellers have appeared in recent years 
complaining that the social fabric of the United States is 
unravelling.i What is at issue is not solely the insistent 
demands emanating from previously unheard of entities such as 
`the Queer Nation' and `Nation of Islam' as well as from more 
familiar ethnic and religious groups. Rather, the `new groupism' 
rests on sophisticated philosophical attacks against the very 
notion of a common American culture. One such criticism argues 
that the American dream had content, but that this content was 
so biased and limited, Waspish and racist that there is no 
reason to lend it any credence.ii Another view sees Anglo-Saxon 
culture in general and American culture in particular as lacking 
content, being so individualist and atomist as to deny the way 
in which collectivities create compelling moral identities for 
their members.iii  Noting the difference between these two views-
-one seeks to abolish any common frame, the other to create one-
-should not obscure their shared belief that the promise of the 
seal of the United States--E pluribus unum--has now lost its 
relevance in an atmosphere of `culture war'.iv 
   The debate about the immorality or absence of a common 
American cultural value system has been posed in another way by  
theorists who lament the supposed development of a new American 
character type, so lacking in moral fibre and fearful of social 
opprobrium as to have no capacity to make ethical commitments. 
This is the `other-directed' American made famous by David 
Riesman and his associates.v Following in Riesman's footsteps, 
Habits of the Heart, the hugely successful recent portrait of 
American life drawn by Robert Bellah and his colleagues, 
presents Americans as individualists without substance, unable 
to undertake principled communal action because they are 
terrified to differ from others in a competitive, fluid and 
atomistic social world.vi  The claim of diminished social 
responsibility has also been made from a somewhat different 
perspective by Robert Putnam when noting that Americans now 
`bowl alone', a development he holds to represent a waning of 
the social capital hitherto created by the associations of civil 
society.vii  
 A paradox is apparent amidst this plethora of discordant 
warnings: Americans are simultaneously imagined to be unable to 
resist the tyranny of groups and to be isolated individualists. 
This suggests the need for reconsideration of the condition of 
the United States in order to reveal the underlying 
institutional patterns and shared cultural values of the 
society, and then to decide whether these institutional 
structures and cultural commonalities are enough to hold America 
together.viii  Any such reconsideration must begin with a 
discussion of history. ix 
With Liberty and Justice for All: The Institutional Framework 
 The first and foremost thing to note about the United 
States is that it never had an old regime. Americans were able 
in consequence to create a society with a unique commitment to 
egalitarianism and to social mobility. Such a future was not 
preordained. The identity of most of the early colonists was 
initially very firmly British, and its leaders took for granted 
the hierarchical class ethic of the colonizing power. At the 
same time, the colonists were also loyal to an ideological 
conception of the rights of free-born Englishmen, and not to a 
particular piece of territory. Ironically, the very Englishness 
of the colonists did much to encourage their rebellion: for 
although the taxation proposed by Westminster in its attempt to 
put its first empire on a sound financial basis was moderate, 
the logistics of eighteenth century power meant that 
consultation by means of representation did not take place, 
thereby infuriating the settlers, who believed they deserved to 
be treated as free-born citizens of the realm. Still, these 
first rebels were men of substance, whose conception of `the 
people' was limited to the propertied.   
 It was only the military exigencies of the struggle for 
independence that forced the American elite to turn to genuinely 
popular elements, both in the cities and in the West, where 
strong egalitarian and individualistic values held sway. The 
ensuing mass military mobilization undermined the potential, 
which had certainly existed, for the emergence of a local old 
regime of hereditary gentry.  That potential was further 
weakened when the property of almost all Loyalist large 
landholders was expropriated, obliging them to flee from the 
United States in numbers five times greater than Royalists from 
France during the Revolution--which to say that America was born 
amidst a dose of political cleansing of a large proportion of 
its potentially aristocratic elements.x More lastingly, the 
revolutionary political elite which laid down constitutional 
principles for the new society could not ignore the popular 
contribution, making an emphasis on liberty, democracy and the 
rights of small property inevitable. Of course, elite distrust 
of the people was an element behind the decision to create a 
system of checks and balances, that is, a political system which 
would be hard for anyone to dominate. Regional fear that one 
part of the country might dominate further weakened the power of 
the central government by introducing a system of federalism and 
by rendering all the states equivalent in the Senate, regardless 
of their actual population. 
 Despite these safeguards, the American nation was very far 
from established in the early years of the republic. Some 
states, most notably Vermont, were reluctant to join the union. 
More importantly, local interests were so divergent that threats 
of secession were made in earnest. Although the earliest of 
these came from the Northern states appalled at the war of 1812, 
the most serious of course came from the South. If the South's 
secession had to do with its fear that it would eventually be 
overwhelmed by new states without slavery, it remains the fact 
that Lincoln, convinced that the United States stood as a beacon 
on the hill for other nations, fought primarily for continuance 
of the Union.xi Military outcomes very often determine national 
histories, and this has most certainly proved true in the United 
States. No further serious challenge has been directed against 
the Union, though the notion of states' rights and a deep 
distrust of the federal government has continued to have a 
constant appeal to local electorates everywhere in America.  
 Of course, territorial continuity is not in itself a 
guarantee of social peace: to the contrary, vicious struggles 
can and do take place within accepted frontiers over the 
definition of a society's character. The classical experience of 
Europe saw religious and class struggles deeply divide even 
those countries which were not polarized by the problem of 
nationalities. Comparative historical sociology most often 
explains class conflict in political terms, stressing the extent 
to which radicalism resulted from the despotic character of 
state power. Most obviously, the various trajectories of 
European labor movements are best understood as the result of 
authoritarian regimes' determination to exclude the people from 
participation.xii For instance, anti-socialist or anti-union 
legislation in Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany made workers 
focus on and attack the state since it was futile for them to 
attempt to organize at the industrial level. In relatively 
liberal Britain, where unionization was possible, conflict was 
diffused more evenly throughout the whole society.xiii  In 
addition, where the state was linked to an official church, 
conflict was likely to be made the more intense by the layering 
of two sources of dispute on top of one another.xiv  The 
occasional intransigence of the left in French history owes much 
to its also being the party of anti-clericalism; in contrast, 
the relative peace of England resulted in part, as the French 
historian Elie Halevy noted, from workers having their own 
religion, so that Methodism replaced the appeal of Marxism.xv 
 These comments allow us to highlight some especially 
salient aspects of the institutions of the United States. The 
American Constitution, by refusing to accept a state religion 
and giving each individual the right of religious freedom, 
ensured that, unlike France, religious disputes would not layer 
themselves on top of any other source of conflict. The Founding 
Fathers thereby created a system whose dynamics were well 
understood by both Adam Smith and Rousseau. Personal religiosity 
and sectarianism were to be encouraged by the lack of an 
established faith, whilst challenges to state authority would be 
limited both by the movement between sects and by the tendency 
for their interests to clash; government could therefore 
encourage the quest for the salvation of one's soul, but 
discourage the existence of any ecclesiastical claims to 
authority in this world. This model came to define the American 
experience of religion: the vast majority are believers, but no 
one religion predominates--whilst new religions are continually 
being born.  The occasional appearance of millennarian 
awakenings and local charismatic cults that has long been 
characteristic of American religious life is a small price to 
pay for the relative stability of this arrangement. 
 A very similar pattern explains the nature of American 
labor history. One of the most famous of all treatises about 
American life asked why there was no socialism and no great 
workers' movement in the United States.xvi The answer is simple.  
Given that all white males achieved the vote in the Jacksonian 
era, even the poorest of them were loath to oppose a state which 
they felt to be their own.  Furthermore, the much publicized 
openness of American society and the spatial and social mobility 
of Americans permitted the vast majority of people to believe 
that by their own efforts they could raise their standards of 
living and perhaps become wealthy themselves, which subverted 
any desire to overthrow the monied elite.  Why destroy those you 
hope to join?  This attitude remains pervasive despite the fact 
that downward mobility, rather than upward mobility, is more the 
rule than the exception in modern America, and in spite of the 
fact that differences between haves and have-nots are 
accelerating.xvii  Nonetheless, recent survey data on all social 
groups in America, including the most disadvantaged, shows that-
-despite some feeble socialistic rhetoric--there is almost no 
popular support for even such minimal redistributive mechanisms 
as a ceiling on income.xviii 
   Aside from reflecting a touching faith in social 
mobility, American acceptance of vast differences in wealth is 
also a secularized transvaluation of the Protestant ethic, 
wherein earned (not inherited) wealth is associated with such 
highly valued characteristics as assertiveness, initiative, 
effort and ability--rather than with membership in an ascribed 
caste or wealthy elite. It is also generally believed that the 
wealthy will lose their riches over the generations, and that 
new hard-working entrepreneurs will take their place. As a 
result, Americans may feel envious of the rich, but they do not 
want to destroy them or flatten out the income curve; rather, 
they want a chance to reach the crest of that curve 
themselves.xix   
 Political arguments about the justice of economic 
inequality in America do not challenge these basic assumptions.  
From the right the argument is that the race is indeed fair; the 
poor have failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered 
to them and to everyone else and so deserve their poverty.  The 
argument from the left is the reverse; the playing field is not 
level, therefore those players who fail are not at fault and 
should be helped to achieve parity.  Both sides accept without 
debate a cultural belief, inherited from Protestantism, that 
only those who are trying seriously to escape poverty and 
succeed in the competition should be given aid; there is no 
charity for those who are `lazy'--as recent debates about 
welfare make clear.  
 Of course, these values exist in tandem with and also 
validate the relentless quest for wealth which has long been a 
central preoccupation for Americans. As Tocqueville wrote in 
1840: `It is odd to watch with what feverish ardor the Americans 
pursue prosperity and how they are ever tormented by the shadowy 
suspicion that they may not have chosen the shortest route to 
get it'.xx  He explains this characteristic obsession in terms of 
the problems of gaining status in an egalitarian society: `When 
the prestige attached to what is old has vanished, men are no 
longer distinguished, or hardly distinguished, by birth, 
standing, or profession; there is thus hardly anything left but 
money which makes very clear distinctions between men or can 
raise some of them above the common level'.xxi  Intense 
competition for status through wealth stimulates the `hypocrisy 
of luxury... peculiar to democratic centuries' where the 
conspicuous consumption of expensive goods is the major route to 
prestige. xxii 
 Within this egalitarian yet aggressive society of assiduous 
consumers, the present day suburban mall has evolved into a 
temple where the adherents of the American cult of shopping can 
worship.  In its protected, artificial and homogenizing 
environment Americans gather to peruse, comment upon and 
purchase the status symbols that not only indicate their 
relative positions vis a vis one another but also show their 
shared participation in the American dream of economic success. 
xxiii It is easy for academics, who tend to disdain the crass 
pleasures of materialism, to underestimate the symbolic 
importance of consumption in bringing Americans together.  Of 
course, there are class divisions here--some malls and the goods 
they offer are for the relatively wealthy, others are for the 
relatively poor--but in all of them the carefully controlled 
environment and the overwhelming display of items for sale is a 
concrete representation of a shared fantasy of achieving and 
displaying material wealth. 
Conflict and Coherence 
 Important qualifications must be added to the argument to 
this point lest it seems unduly complacent. Although it is 
clearly the case that the quintessential American dream is one 
of gaining riches and thereby status, and that Americans have 
been, and continue to be, bound together by their shared hope 
for success in that quest, this ambition is rendered most 
plausible during the periods of productivity and wealth 
generated by American capitalism.  But America has not always 
been an economic dynamo, and those who lived through the 
depression have a very different attitude toward consumption and 
display than their younger fellow citizens.  
 The experience of economic deprivation in a society where 
no one is ever content with his or her lot also helps account 
for the fact the United States had more deaths at the end of the 
nineteenth century through labor violence--in absolute terms and 
in proportion to population size--than any other country except 
Tsarist Russia.xxiv  But instances of industrial rioting for 
higher wages ought not to be taken as indicating a serious rift 
in American society.  It is important to note that violence 
directed against strikers came from Pinkerton detectives rather 
than from the central state. Such action of course depended upon 
judicial consent, and here the fact that capitalist property 
rights were so early on enshrined in a written constitution 
mattered a great deal. Nonetheless, participation in the polity, 
the possibility of reform and especially the felt opportunity 
for eventually gaining wealth were also available to workers, 
and these powerfully undercut class unity, despite a short-lived 
surge of leftist activity among radical unions such as the 
I.W.W.   
 Equally, religious persecution has a long and ugly history 
in the United States, from colonial times when Quaker 
missionaries were killed as heretics by New England Puritans, to 
the nineteenth century when Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet, 
was murdered, and up to the present day, in the immolation of 
David Koresh and his followers. Less apocalyptically, anti-
Semitic, anti-Catholic, and now anti-Muslim hate literature 
continues to proliferate in the more paranoid segments of 
American popular culture. However, in general the state has only 
actively participated in religious persecution when the cult in 
question was held to be actively challenging government 
authority--as in the stockpiling of weapons by Koresh.  Rather 
than facing persecution, religions of all sorts have instead 
been easily absorbed within the amorphous American framework, so 
that nowadays Jews, Catholics, Muslims, and Hindus are lumped 
together with the predominant Protestant sects as part of a 
multitude of denominations all of whom are assumed to be 
worshipping, in some fashion or another, the same God. In fact, 
the main problem for religious groups in America is not 
persecution, but maintaining some form of distinctiveness, as 
interfaith marriage is increasingly common, and religion becomes 
more and more a matter of choice, not birth.xxv 
 So religious and class differences, although sometimes 
violent, have not in the final analysis significantly challenged 
the relative stability of the United States. Nor has ethnic 
conflict, which has torn other societies asunder, had much 
effect in America. This is not because of lack of opportunity. 
As Michael Lind has pointed out, the United States was 
relatively homogenous ethnically until the huge mass 
immigrations from Europe that occurred the end of nineteenth 
century.xxvi  This immigration, was a `second revolution' which 
challenged the authority of the Anglo-Saxon majority. Racial 
prejudice against these newcomers was rampant for a time, both 
among the elite and the masses, as learned doctors documented 
the cranial limitations of the Irish and the natural brutishness 
of the Poles while murderous race riots erupted in urban 
ghettoes.   
 Yet, far from causing American society to disintegrate, 
this influx of `foreigners', most of whom were in fact white 
Europeans, actually strengthened the nation--in part because 
their loyalty was to the idea of America rather than to any 
particular place, in part because the host society responded by 
creating the most inclusive public educational system within the 
advanced capitalist world, which immeasurably helped to 
incorporate the immigrants into their new society. A host of 
studies tell us that the overwhelming experience of immigrant 
familes was that of transformation into Americans. The majority 
of immigrants willingly accepted deculturation and the loss of 
their native languages in order to embrace wholeheartedly the 
opportunity for their children to succeed and to participate 
politically that had been lacking in their homelands. In 
amazingly short order European immigrants who had been 
considered, and who had considered themselves, to be absolutely 
distinctive and impenetrable races were redefined as hyphenated 
Americans, distinguishable from one another primarily by food 
preferences and ethnic holidays. Since the Second World War, 
intermarriage among these `ethnics', like intermarriage between 
religious groups, has become pervasive.xxvii For contemporary 
American suburbanites belonging to an ethnic community has now 
become primarily a matter of personal choice, albeit a choice 
that is validated by a biological ideology of 
`naturalness'.xxviii 
 We can say then that the historic achievement of the United 
States is remarkable, especially when seen in comparative 
perspective: it is that of a nearly complete assimilation of 
immigrants, combined with a remarkable absence of concerted 
class warfare or religious violence. The analytic point about 
this pattern is that the United States has long demonstrated a 
strong homogenizing nationalism that draws its citizens away 
from any particular ethnic, class or religious identity.  
Alternative visions have been marginalized in favor of a 
standard notion of what America ought to be, namely, `the land 
of opportunity' where old settlers and new migrants, rich and 
poor, Protestant and Catholic, all have an equal chance to gain 
economic success through hard work and individual enterprize, 
and where `the voice of the people' rules a democratic polity 
that is not tarnished by aristocratic pretensions.   
The Homogenizing Power of American Culture 
 Americans themselves generally believe, as one of our 
students proudly put it: `We Americans don't have a culture; we 
are all different'. American intellectuals arguing for the 
stability of the society have tended to accept the premise that 
Americans indeed lack a culture, and to assert that the United 
States coheres because of its institutions and the democratic 
and liberal ideals that underlie them.  So long as Americans 
have faith in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, they have 
no need of a shared cultural identity, but can exist within a 
pluralistic `nation of nations'.xxix But this sanguine view 
leaves aside two important facts.  The first is that to have any 
lasting effect ideals cannot be institutionally imposed, but 
must resonate with pre-existent shared perceptions and ways of 
being in the world.  Many societies, after all, have wonderfully 
democratic and liberal constitutions, yet manage to be 
totalitarian and genocidal despite them. Secondly, grade-school 
civic lessons aside, very few native-born Americans have any 
clear idea of what the sacred documents of the nation actually 
contain, but they are Americans all the same, instantly 
recognizable not by their differences but by their enormous 
similarities.   
 This commonness of the culture of the United States can be 
approached by a moment's reflection on the claim noted, namely, 
that Americans are different and so do not share a culture.  No 
sentiment could be more quintessentially American! For the 
assertion itself rests on a culturally specific faith that all 
persons are independent actors, each separately responsible for 
his or her own fate and endowed with a God-given potential for 
free choice and agency. Ideally, all such persons are equal 
before God and the law, with equivalent rights and privileges, 
and all are worthy of respect regardless of wealth, prestige or 
power. This pervasive belief, derived in part from the 
historical absence of an aristocracy in the United States, in 
part from the culturally dominant Protestant faith in the 
capacity of individuals to choose their own fates, and in part 
from the great social mobility of American society, has always 
been expressed in ordinary interaction through an absence of 
deference and by strong moral demands for the expression of 
equal esteem for all members of the community. The historian 
David Fischer notes that from colonial times `extreme 
inequalities of material condition were joined to an intense 
concern for equality of esteem' as rich and poor `wore similar 
clothing and addressed each other by first names. They worked, 
ate, laughed, played and fought together on a footing of 
equality'.xxx  
 Despite ever greater distinctions in rank and wealth, 
Americans remain extremely careful to cloak authority relations 
with the trappings of equality.  On the job subordinates are 
`team members' whose `consent' and `cooperation' are `requested' 
by their `supervisor'. At home it is perfectly acceptable to 
have servants or to go to an elite school, but not to put the 
servants in livery or to have a genteel accent; in short, it is 
politically correct to be rich and powerful just so long as one 
does not make claims to be different and better.  The surest way 
to be ostracized by Americans is to have the reputation of being 
a snob; the surest way to be accepted is to be friendly and 
`nice' to everyone, regardless of status.xxxi  
 Such effacement might seem to conflict with the well-
publicized self-assertiveness of Americans - an assertiveness 
strikingly indicated by national surveys showing that 70 percent 
of Americans think they are above average in terms of 
leadership!  But we should note as well that even more striking 
statistics apply for Americans' notions of their `ability to get 
along well with others' where none believe they are below 
average, 60 percent report themselves to be in the top ten 
percent, and 25 percent believe they are in the top one 
percentile!xxxii  These seemingly contradictory findings can be 
reconciled once we note that Americans find status and respect 
primarily through being liked, and want leaders whom they can 
like in turn. Therefore, for Americans the ordinary Joe is the 
better leader, and it makes sense that the majority of 
Americans, ordinary Joes (and Janes) who try hard to be nice and 
adapt to the needs of others, feel they are, as a result, 
potential leaders. 
 Americans `niceness' and distaste for elitism, so often 
commented on with various degrees of amusement or condescension 
by foreign visitors, correlates with a fluid social world where 
there are no clear status markers; this unstable and potentially 
threatening universe is made liveable by the expectation that 
one's own friendliness and helpfulness will usually be 
reciprocated.xxxiii  Such an attitude can only exist in 
conjunction with a basic sense of trust in the public sphere, 
which is believed to be populated by men and women who, like 
oneself, are basically fair, decent, and kindly.  Social trust 
is a legacy of the original Protestant covenanted community, now 
transformed, as noted above, into the larger secularized social 
world where the primary values are being `well liked' and 
`getting along well with others'.  Training toward these ends is 
clearest in the American school system, where popular students 
are elected as student body leaders whose job is to `represent' 
their fellows, where `school spirit' is heavily promoted, and 
where children are graded on the quality of their `citizenship'.  
Students are also expected to participate in extracurricular 
activities that oblige them to cooperate together on a voluntary 
basis.  Team sports especially are highly valued as an 
expression of `school spirit' and local pride, where individuals 
can show off their personal talents while helping their team 
mates to victory through disciplined self-sacrifice and 
cooperation. These institutions have nothing to do with formal 
education, everything to do with learning how to participate 
peacefully in a competitive society of co-equal individuals.xxxiv   
  Alongside diffuse trust goes another characteristic 
American stance, that of `moral minimalism', which prohibits 
overt interference with or judgement upon other people.xxxv  This 
ethical position of benign detachment, like the requirement to 
be nice to everyone, is a product of the underlying American 
value system of individualistic egalitarianism, which means that 
all persons have the freedom to make their own fates, without 
restraint from their neighbors, and, concomitantly, should not 
meddle with anyone else either.  This American pattern 
especially correlates with the roomy and fluid world of the 
suburb, where there is no need for individuals to confront one 
another, where it is even possible for members of the same 
household to have separate rooms, separate schedules, separate 
meals, and almost never to come in contact.xxxvi Under these 
conditions, Americans tolerate diversity, so long as they are 
not obliged to interact with others who are too different from 
themselves, that is, who are `snobs' or `not nice', or with 
people who are intrusive and make demands on their time and 
autonomy.  
 The violent hatreds that motivate ethnic cleansing and 
nationalistic pride are not to be found here. Rather, modern-day 
middle class Americans are weakly held together precisely by 
their bland acceptance of one another, an acceptance that is 
smoothed over by the ideal of friendly interaction, and 
justified by a common belief that nothing in the public world--
or even in the private world--is really worth getting too 
excited about. This may not be heroic, and it may not provide 
strong ties, but its very mildness has obvious benefits.xxxvii  
 Beneath the generalized `niceness', social trust and moral 
minimalism of America stands the basic premise that 
`individualism is natural, community problematical.  Society has 
to be built'.xxxviii  Generated again from Protestant principles 
in the context of American social openness, this perspective 
imagines society not as a pre-existent entity but as a moral 
corporation knitted together by voluntary agreements between 
independent and co-equal agents each bearing personal 
responsibility for their acts. In a real sense, this notion of 
the political community replicates the image of the egalitarian 
American family; an institution, as the anthropologist David 
Schneider demonstrates, that is believed to be a locus of 
"diffuse, enduring solidarity" where authority is democratically 
exercised through consensus and affection and where all are 
treated equally without regard to status, power or capacity 
because, ideally at any rate, all love and are loved 
equally.xxxix  
 In the familial vision of the American community, political 
action takes on a sacred aura, and political power holders are 
imagined as exemplary figures, who must always demonstrate that 
they are not egoists or supporters of special interests, but 
rather are agents of consensus and selfless servants of all the 
people in a nation that ought to resemble a loving family.   
This high moral ideal gives Americans a strong sense that their 
polity is not just the locus of power seeking and deal making, 
but is the ethical center of a society based on shared caring 
and common humanity. American presidents, in particular, portray 
themselves and are portrayed in the cultural imagination as 
expansive and encompassing symbolic figures who reach beyond 
interest groups and despised `party politics' so as to work for 
the `good of the nation'. The emotional expressiveness 
increasingly demanded of presidential figures is an indicator of 
this function, since the revelation and sharing of strong 
emotion demonstrates the president's common humanity--whereas 
policies and `politics' are divisive.   Voters who can 
sympathize with a president's personal tragedies and family 
trials will feel a comforting communion with him: he is a good 
man who suffers just as I do, his nobility and compassion are 
like my own.   
 In sum, America is a unique society based upon shared 
values of egalitarian individualism and capitalist free 
enterprize.  It has demonstrated an astonishing capacity to 
integrate new immigrants, to defuse religious, class and ethnic 
hostilities, and to promote a homogenized national culture.  
This culture is animated by dreams of monetary success in the 
competitive marketplace, but this is softened by an ethic of 
generalized social trust and a pervasive interaction style that 
combines `niceness' with moral minimalism.  Within this shared 
frame of reference, Americans imagine their social universe to 
be, in its ideal form, an extended family, based on the love and 
voluntary co-operation of co-equals engaged in the joint task of 
building a community.  From the point of view of its citizens, 
the United States is the best of all possible worlds, one that, 
by and large, delivers on its promises.  Instead of ethnic 
nationalism, Americans have the nationalism of an ideal: they 
firmly believe that, if they could, everyone in the world would 
love to join them, and become citizens of the United States. 
American Civilization and Its Discontents 
 The American experience is fraught, like any other, with 
inner tensions that provide the dynamic for its movement.  What 
is perhaps unique is that Americans believe this should not be 
so!  Pervasive idealism about politics, for instance, means that 
the electorate is continually disappointed when its leaders 
prove to be fraudulent in their claims that they serve neither 
themselves nor any interest group, but rather are dedicated to 
the higher communal end of representing `all the people'. An 
increased scrutiny of public figures and the widely reported 
mass contempt for them reflects deep ambivalence toward the 
political realm as sacred ideals of selfless community service 
are increasingly seen to clash with unacceptable realities of 
difference and interest, and as politicians are shown up as 
heroes with feet of clay--which could never happen if they were 
not thought of as heroes in the first place. 
 Another element in the widespread sense of malaise in 
America is the equally ambivalent relationship Americans have 
with groups.  Tocqueville was perhaps the first to note that 
Americans are great joiners, finding refuge from a competitive 
universe by associating together in a vast array of civic and 
social organizations.  Important recent research shows that this 
continues to be the case: there may be truth to Putnam's claim 
that membership of bowling leagues has fallen, but that there is 
none to his more general notion of `declining social capital'--
as can be seen in the huge growth of membership in therapy 
groups, childrens' football leagues and in health clubs.xl   
 But what matters more than sheer numbers are the beliefs 
entertained about group life. Associations are believed to be 
held together, as noted, less by interest than by shared love 
and mutual caring.  Disagreement is kept to a minimum in favor 
of enjoyment of one another's company,xli and there is usually a 
concerted effort to avoid the appearance of any form of 
hierarchy, for fear of being called a snob. Each such group 
feels itself to be unique, though for an outsider the actual 
differences between groups may appear negligible.  For instance, 
self-identified members of ethnic groups often believe their 
group has many distinctive rituals, where in truth the rituals 
are shared by almost all Americans xlii. Similarly, middle class 
black and white college students may vehemently claim that they 
belong to completely different `cultures', but for an observer 
the discernable differences between the two groups are 
negligible. xliii  While we do not seek to downplay the 
subjective importance of multiple cultural identities in 
America, there remains everything to be said for Tocqueville's 
notion that the characteristic American elaboration of small 
differences is best understood as an effort to establish a 
personal identity and a place of comfort and community within 
the homogenizing and competitive world of the United States xliv. 
 A number of consequences follow from this effort.  Members 
of American groups tend to feel themselves united by shared 
caring and kind intentions; they are good people and good 
citizens, acting as `everybody' should act.  But they are 
suspicious of the motivations of members of other groups, who 
may only be pretending to be decent and caring persons in order 
to further their special interests against the interests of the 
whole.  For example, college students typically describe their 
own group as a bunch of friends, while other groups are 
`cliques'.  Similarly, American social activists see themselves 
as trying to draw people into the community, while their 
opponents describe them as power-hungry and exclusionary.xlv  
  The tension between an idealized us and a demonized them 
manifests itself at every level of American culture.  Survey 
research on the leading members of a variety of influence blocs-
-labor leaders, businessmen, feminists, bankers, farmers, media 
people, blacks, students, and so on--shows that in general their 
ideals are the same as the ideals of the public at large.xlvi  
But all of them disagree about who actually does have influence, 
and all see `themselves as the victims not of a system deaf to 
all groups but of a system that "plays favorites"'.xlvii Only 
one's own group is pure, and only one's own group therefore 
actually holds the general will at heart.  It follows that one's 
own group should dominate, since only one's own group actually 
expresses the true voice of the public. This circle of self-
delusion and self-congratulation among groups validates public 
qualms about corruption and degeneration in the political realm, 
and leads to further cynicism about--and withdrawal from--
political action, back to the realm of personal friends and 
family.xlviii  It should be emphasized, however, that the 
pervasive ambivalence of Americans about politicians and groups 
does not threaten the society with disruption. In fact, it makes 
it harder for any group or individual to present themselves as 
the savior of the American way, and so provides a base for the 
mundane continuance of a social order based on trust of other 
Americans as individuals, distrust of them in groups or as 
leaders. 
 Much more troubling is the continued prevalence of anti-
black racism in America.xlix  While white ethnics (and, to a 
lesser extent, Asians and Latinos) have been `melted' into 
American society, retaining only symbolic cultural identity, 
those of African descent, who have been in America from the 
beginning, still feel themselves to be excluded and 
discriminated against, despite their best efforts to participate 
in the American dream.l 
 The most obvious reasons for this unhappy situation are to 
be found in America's cruel history of slavery.  The humiliation 
of bondage, especially in a society where freedom and equality 
are so highly valued, is a stigma that is hard to erase, and 
African Americans continue to be tainted with that dishonoring 
heritage, which is exacerbated by the fact that, to quote 
Tocqueville once again, `the insubstantial and ephemeral fact of 
servitude is most fatally combined with the physical and 
permanent fact of differences in race. Memories of slavery 
disgrace the race, and race perpetuates memories of slavery'.li  
The problems of the historical memory of a slave past are 
compounded by the continued poverty, powerlessness and 
ghettoization of a huge number of African-Americans. Their low 
status reinforces negative attitudes of whites towards them 
while also solidifying their own sense of exclusion and 
indignity.  The amplifying layering effect of group hostilities 
so brilliantly avoided in American religious matters thus 
resurfaces with a vengeance in American race relations. 
 Alongside these causes, there is a less well known source 
for the continued gap between blacks and whites, one that can be 
best understood as a dreadful corollary of the blanket American 
faith in equality.  To account for real inequality, or even for 
difference, Americans tend strongly to `naturalize' 
distinctions, making biology the source of differences that the 
ideology cannot explain.  We can see this tendency manifested in 
the apparently perverse claims made by white `hyphenated' 
ethnics that they can recognize innate biological 
characteristics of their chosen ethnic group.  Belonging then 
becomes `natural', and not to be altered, despite the real 
permeability of ethnic categories. If this is so for white 
ethnics, it is even more so for African-Americans, whose skin 
color renders their difference obvious, and whose poverty and 
high crime rate can then be attributed to that difference.lii The 
same method has, of course, been used to deny equality to women 
as well.  Biologizing inferiority allows maintenance of the 
faith in human equality in the face of blatant bigotry and 
oppression through the simple expedient of denying some people 
full human status.liii   
 Well-meaning attempts to redress this and other racial 
injustices has led to the development of the categories of the 
census which create five types of ethnic American (including the 
catch-all category of `Hispanics')liv and to the much bludgeoned 
demon of multiculturalism. Does this mean that groupism is 
stronger, that America's power to homogenize is over?  The 
preponderance of evidence suggests a negative answer. Despite 
all the publicity, ethnicity remains a relatively weak identity 
marker with very little content; it has the subjective value of 
giving a vaguely personalized community in a world of diffuse 
and atomistic relationships.  Nonetheless, like class and 
religion, ethnicity seems to have minimal potential to develop 
into oppositional movements with any substantial alternative 
content.  Rather, ethnic identity groups, like sexual identity 
organizations or religious sects or twelve-step groups, will 
multiply and subdivide, as Americans choose the communal 
identity that `feels best' to them. 
 At the same time, we will also see a continuance of the 
tendency for these groups to make claims to be `natural' in 
order to validate their existence and maintain their solidarity, 
so that gays have to `act gay', blacks will have to `act black' 
and Hispanics to `act Hispanic', whatever these terms may mean.  
But such claims--presently authorized at least for `races' in 
the census categories--will inevitably be contested, as the 
individualist, self-assertive side of American culture comes to 
the fore, and as people refuse to be pigeon-holed into 
prearranged categories--however `natural' they are claimed to be 
by those with in interest in maintaining them. 
 The real danger is that some Americans may continue to find 
it especially difficult to make such self-assertions; they 
cannot choose who they want to be, but instead have negative 
identities thrust upon them. The effort to turn a bad hand into 
a good one by repudiating the culture that dealt it is an 
understandable reaction lv, but one that takes for granted 
exactly those cultural premises of the United States we have 
already noted: that people have a God-given right to manufacture 
their own identities and assert themselves within the social and 
political marketplace. Black Americans' belief that they can and 
should struggle against oppression and for justice and equity 
actually shows the depth of their Americanness.lvi  That many 
white Americans can understand and sympathize with the plight of 
African Americans shows that racial prejudice, although 
generated by the contradictions of American egalitarianism, is 
never wholly legitimated within it, and that the struggle 
against racism is as much a part of the American grain as is 
racism itself. It also behoves us to note that those who feel 
themselves utterly excluded and alienated from American culture 
lack the structural resources to mount a challenge of any real 
seriousness against the stability of the society--a reflection 
that of course makes apparent the extent to which the notion of 
`stability' is value-laden.    
Conclusion 
 In this short paper, we have sought to refute the claim 
that America is falling apart. On the one hand, the 
institutional structure of the United States has the capacity to 
diffuse potentially divisive conflicts between classes, 
religious sects and ethnic communities throughout society--
rather than concentrating them against the state. On the other 
hand, as long as the economy is healthy, putative new identities 
and groups do not offer any real challenge to the basic premises 
of American culture, nor is the highly flexible social fabric of 
America likely to be torn asunder by their demands.  Whether 
black or white, gay or straight, female or male, the vast 
majority of Americans continue to believe in the possibilities 
of economic success and to act as if the world was made up of 
nice nonjudgmental individuals who build familial communities 
through mutual and voluntary cooperation.  Despite the 
inevitable, and wrenching, tensions and paradoxes implicit in 
this idealized belief system, it shows no signs of losing its 
hold. 
 It may be useful to highlight the argument by reflecting 
upon the notion of civil society. In a characteristically 
brilliant argument, Daniel Bell once claimed the the United 
States was nothing but a civil society. lvii There is a good deal 
of sense to this: the diffusion of conflict within society 
results precisely a plurality of groups whose interests are not 
united against an overbearing state. But our argument goes 
beyond Bell's.  Most obviously, we have stressed the presence of 
a common cultural frame, acceptance of which plays as 
significant a part in limiting conflict as does the sheer fact 
of pluralism.  
 But a more subtle point needs to be made, and this can 
follow from a fuller definition of civil society.lviii Civility 
in society--rather than, as the traditional definition has it, 
the mere presence of strong and autonomous groups within 
society--depends upon a particular social agreement to agree to 
live together with difference. The greatest example of such an 
agreement in European history remains that symbolised by the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648: given that neither side could win 
the religious wars, it suddenly became reasonable to consider 
religion a private rather than a public affair--and thereby to 
live with genuine difference. lix 
 Given this definition, we can see that the United States is 
not really a civil society in the full sense suggested, though 
it is indeed a society where considerable personal civility is 
practiced.  Clearly, despite the plethora of noisy interest 
groups, in the United States there is little recognition, 
whether resigned or enthusiastic, of genuinely alternative ways 
of life, despite the rhetoric about difference.  This point can 
be underscored by noting a standard European joke about American 
foreign policy: the United States wishes people to be free to 
choose--just so long as they choose the American way. And this 
is scarcely surprising: the American experience has not been 
that of the clash of utterly different ways of life--except for 
the challenge from the South, whose opposition was so completely 
destroyed. Rather, the differences that exist in American 
civilization are objectively relatively small: whilst 
ideologically `all are different', Americans in fact are 
remarkably `all the same'. The homogenizing powers of this 
framework have been astonishing, and the dynamics of the culture 
suggest that this is scarcely likely to change: America will 
remain a land intolerant of real divergence, but simultaneously 
capable of absorbing differences and turning outsiders into 
Americans in short order. 
 We can conclude normatively by suggesting that no very 
harsh judgement be made about this powerful homogenising force. 
For one thing, homogenisation is to a universal ideal which, 
however imperfectly realised, stands far removed from the ethnic 
particularisms that can tear at the heart of most nations. For 
another, it is as well to remember that the seventeenth century 
European invention of the ideal of toleration was followed first 
by the ideological surge of the French revolutionary period and 
then by fascism and communism, the two great totalitarian 
ideological forces of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century.lx  In contrast, America's homogenizing capacities have 
ensured that its internal conflicts have not led to world war. 
Perhaps then, given the American experience, we should show some 
skepticism towards the unfettered praise of difference that 
dominates contemporary social theory: there may be something to 
be said for the decencies of a  little dullness and the comforts 
of a measure of conformity.  
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